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It is a stylized fact that marriage formation generally involves positive assortative matching 
(PAM) on education. We test whether this is also the case for immigrants who tend to import 
their spouses and potentially use education as an exchange mechanism. We find that only 
women match positively on education. For Turks the results robustly confirm PAM, whereas 
for Pakistanis there is no evidence of PAM. For men there is local support to the exchange 
hypothesis, since cultural assimilation or conflicts with parents, through less spouse import, 
increase the likelihood of marrying a highly educated spouse. 
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1.  Introduction 
A large literature is concerned with the correlation between levels of education of two 
spouses. In theory the correlation may be positive or negative because education of the two 
spouses may be either complements or substitutes in production of marital capital (Becker 
1973). However, the empirical literature agrees that the correlation is positive, and therefore 
the question boils down to an issue of the degree of homogamy over time and across countries 
(e.g. Smits et al., 1998; Halpin and Chan, 2002; Mare, 1991). Only few studies look at the 
issue of educational homogamy in the case of interethnic marriages, but also these studies 
find support for positive assortative mating by education (Lievens, 1998; Qian, 1999; Qian et 
al., 2001; Kalmijn, 1993). No studies have addressed this issue in relation to marriage 
migration or imported spouses.  
Studying marriage migration between less developed countries and developed countries, the 
issue of assortative matching on education is particularly interesting because education may 
be exchanged for other resources. Marriage migration between a less developed country and a 
developed country may be seen as an exchange of favourable living conditions against, for 
instance, a high bride price or a high education (Gitmez and Wilpert, 1987; Böcker, 1994, 
1995; Van Amersfoort, 1995). This is a special case of the exchange hypothesis as posed by 
Davis (1941) and Merton (1941). They hypothesize that two spouses exchange resources, e.g. 
higher status for good looks or money, by their marriage. In Becker’s terminology, this would 
be consistent with negative or non-positive assortative matching on education since the 
educations of the two spouses would be substitutes. Qian (1999) investigates whether 
interethnic marriage in the US may be explained by immigrants exchanging high education 
for a white spouse, and he rejects this hypothesis.  
In this paper, we investigate the degree of educational homogamy between spouses in couples 
involving at least one immigrant. We focus on the education of couples involving Turkish, 
Pakistani and Ex-Yugoslavian immigrants in Denmark, whose marriage behaviour is 
described in detail by Celikaksoy (2003). By use of a survey from 1999, we test two 
hypotheses; the hypothesis of positive assortative matching (PAM) and the exchange 
hypothesis. Regarding PAM, the idea is that if the stylized fact of positive assortative 
matching also describes marriage behaviour of immigrants in Denmark, one would expect 
that individuals in the upper (lower) end of the educational distribution tend to marry other 
individuals from the upper (lower) part of the educational distribution for that particular 
demographic group. We test the exchange hypothesis by studying whether individuals tend to 
get a spouse further up or down in the educational distribution by importing a spouse. If the 
individual tends to get a better educated spouse as a result of spouse import, it indicates that 
education of the imported spouse is traded for good living conditions in the host country 
(Denmark). If on the other hand, the individual tends to get a less educated spouse as a result 
of spouse import, it indicates that the imported spouse has some favourable attributes that 
compensate for the lack of education.   2
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sketches the theoretical framework. Section 3 
describes the data set and variables used. Section 4 presents the empirical analyses to test the 
two main hypotheses, the PAM hypothesis and the exchange hypothesis. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  A simple theory of marriage and marriage migration 
In this section, we sketch a theoretical framework describing the marriage decision of 
immigrants. In the context of immigrants in a host country like Denmark, the marriage 
decision consists of two simultaneous choices. As in standard marriage decisions, the 
individuals decide whom to marry in terms of observed characteristics/qualifications. In 
addition, they decide from which country the spouse should come, that is the source country 
or host country. The decision to marry and the decision to import a marriage migrant are 
assumed to be simultaneous decisions that depend upon the characteristics that are brought 
into a marriage by the spouses. The characteristics of the spouses are summarized in marital 
capital, which includes for instance physical capital, financial capital (such as bride price or 
dowry) and human capital (such as health or education). 
2.1.  Marriage model 
The theoretical background for our empirical model for marriage migration is to be found in 
the Becker model (1973). It builds on the assumption that marriage markets in the source 
country (inhabitants indexed s) and in the host country (inhabitants indexed i) are 
competitive.
1 
The decision to marry is considered as a decision taken by the household of the young 
individual. An immigrant household considering marriage has to choose between two 
alternative marriage markets. When a household chooses to enter another marriage market 
than the local marriage market, this reflects that the utility of a match in that marriage market 
is higher than the utility of a match with a person from the local marriage market (or any other 
relevant alternative).
2 For marriage migration actually to take place, this must be the case for 
both households.
3 
It is assumed that the benefit of the match can be separated between the two spouses. The 
utility of the two individuals is denoted   for , ,
j
jk Uj k i s = , where j refers to the household 
                                                 
1 We abstract from search costs, which are really distributed among many agents other than the immigrant household, agents 
who are involved in the match-making process, namely, relatives, neighbours and friends. 
2 If the quality of a match is uncertain, the relevant comparison would be between expected utilities plus a risk premium. In 
that case, one reason for choosing marriage migration could be risk aversion combined with better information as concerns 
the norms and values of potential spouses from the country of origin. Some notes on marriage and risk are given by Weiss 
(1997). 
3 The rate of success in a given market depends on the accessibility of the market. For the case of marriage migration, the 
availability of contact to relatives or villagers in the country of origin in the exterior marriage market is crucial.   3
under consideration (immigrant, i, or source country person, s) and k denotes the origin of the 
partner. The probability of a match involving marriage migration may be written as 
Prob({ , }) ( )
iiss
is ii is ss is PU U U U =≥ ∧ ≥  
namely the joint probability that both households prefer a marriage involving a person from 
the other marriage market. The utility functions, which may differ across households, are 
assumed to depend on the characteristics of the individuals in terms of marital capital 
(,) jk M M :  
(,)  
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It is seen that the functional form of the utility functions (f(.) and g(.)) is allowed to differ 
across households and across marriage markets. The probability that marriage migration is 
optimal for a given household (i.e. 
jj
jk jj UU ≥ ) is high if the potential spouse from the exterior 
marriage market has favorable characteristics (Mk) that contribute to the utility of his/her 
spouse. Similarly, if the household for given values of marital capital, (,) j k M M , favours 
marriage migration, that would also increase the probability of marriage migration. This is the 
case if the functional form of g(.) assigns a higher level of utility to a given combination of 
(,) jk M M than f(.). 
It is important to separate the determinants of the utility of marriage migration into marital 
capital, reflected in (,) j k M M , and preferences, that is the functional form of the utility 
function,  g(.). The utility function probably differs across gender, because it depends on 
whether the individual is looking for a breadwinner or a caretaker. In our empirical analysis, 
marital capital is mainly education, whereas the preference parameters are going to be 
approximated by country of origin, gender and a set of attitudinal variables. These variables 
can be viewed as proxies for the norms or attitudes of the immigrant household, or they can 
be viewed as correlated with an imposed responsibility of the immigrant household to help 
their countrymen to access the host country. 
2.2.  Two testable hypotheses 
The optimal combination of marital capital depends on whether the marital capital of the two 
spouses is complements or substitutes. Becker (1973) predicts that for some characteristics 
(e.g. physical appearance and intelligence) positive assortative matching (PAM) occurs and 
for others (e.g. earnings and labour supply) negative assortative matching is likely to occur. 
Below, we focus on assortative mating on education at the time of marriage, since education 
is the only variable that is observed for both partners in the empirical analysis.   4
In theory, either negative or positive assortative mating on education could be present. 
Negative or non-positive assortative mating would confirm with the exchange hypothesis 
dating back to Davis (1941) and Merton (1941), which indicates that two spouses exchange 
resources (e.g. higher status for good looks or money) by their marriage. Qian (1999) 
investigates whether interethnic marriage in the US may be explained by immigrants 
exchanging high education for a white spouse. He rejects this hypothesis. In fact, no empirical 
study to our knowledge finds negative assortative mating on education. All empirical studies 
find positive correlations between the educations of spouses, and the hypothesis of 
educational homogamy has never been rejected. Therefore, the question usually boils down to 
an issue of degree of homogamy over time and across countries (Smits et al., 1998; Mare, 
1991; Halpin and Chan, 2002). 
However, in the case of marriage migration, which can be viewed as a new sort of chain 
migration in Western Europe, we might observe negative assortative mating as a consequence 
of exchange between the spouses. Revisiting Gitmez and Wilpert (1987) and Van Amersfoort 
(1995), marriage migration is described as an exchange of favourable living conditions 
against for instance a high bride price. Or, in accordance with Lievens (1999), a high human 
capital of the immigrant could be exchanged for unspoiled norms on the side of the marriage 
migrant, because a young man may prefer a spouse from the country of origin, if he finds that 
native women and also immigrant women living in the host country are too modern and 
behave too freely. However, we might also see the traditional positive assortative mating, 
which would confirm with the observation of Kalmijn (1993) that second generation 
immigrants in the United States (from European origin) choose their partners on the basis of 
educational equality rather than on the basis of equal origin. However, Non-Western 
immigrants in Europe have relatively more traditional norms, which allow marriage patterns 
of traditional societies to persist even after migration. Smits et al. (1998) discuss status 
homogamy as a predecessor for educational homogamy. Earlier, the spouses matched based 
on social background (i.e. parental education/occupation) rather than the spouses’ educational 
levels.
4 
In the empirical part of the paper, we analyse the probability that an immigrant marries a 
spouse from the upper part of the relevant educational distribution, while taking into account 
that the decision to import a spouse may be endogenous. Hence, the characteristic of main 
interest is education labelled marital capital(,) j k M M . We can then test whether PAM applies 
in the case of marriage migration or whether marriage migration matching behaviour is better 
described by the exchange theory. We boil down a range of attitudinal variables to two factors 
in order to account for differences in the preferences for importing a spouse. Below, we 
describe the data and then turn to the empirical analysis. 
                                                 
4 See e.g. Blau and Duncan (1967).   5
3.  Data description 
3.1.  Description of the data source 
The data source consists of 693 relatively young first generation immigrants from Ex-
Yugoslavia, Turkey and Pakistan. Denmark imported its ‘guest workers’ mainly from these 
three countries in the 1960s and early 1970s. The sample consists of children of the guest 
workers born before the arrival to Denmark. At the time of the interview in 1999, the 
individuals had been in Denmark at least 20 years and their age ranged from 25 to 37 years, 
with an average age of 33 years.
5 Jakobsen (2003) reports that the survey respondents tend to 
be favourably selected and that the level of education reported in the survey is slightly higher 
than the education information for the same individual found in register data. However, we 
need survey information to be able to include attitudinal variables, which are important for 
marriage decisions. In addition, in the register data we do not have full information on the 
education of immigrants who had their education in the country of origin, which would be a 
problem especially in the case of the marriage migrant spouse. As we are concerned with the 
marriage decision, we select individuals who are married and not yet divorced at the time of 
the survey.
6 That makes 77% of the sampled individuals, which means that the sample size is 
reduced to 535 individuals. Below, we describe the data in more detail. 
Figure 1 shows the distribution of individuals over education. The level of education was 
extremely low because some people had not completed any education at all. Among men, 
about half had education beyond basic school, whereas among women 35% had education 
beyond basic school. 
                                                 
5 Some of the individuals were interviewed also in 1988. We do not use this information in our analysis because the questions 
asked were different. Also, the two waves are in the form of an unbalanced panel with potential sample selection problems as 
well as an important number of missing data due to potentially non-random attrition (25% in 1988 and 37% in 1999), see 
Jakobsen (2003). 
6 We need to exclude those who divorced or separated before the survey because we do not have information about the 
education of their spouse, which forms the basis for the dependent variable.   6























Figure 2 shows the percentage of imported partners for the different levels of education. 
Individuals who have imported their spouses constitute 87% of the sample, the number 
decreases with education. As it can be seen from the histogram, more than 90% of the 
individuals with no diploma have imported their partner, whereas “only” 43% of those with a 
long higher education have imported their partner.   






















3.2.  The education variables 
The focus of this paper is on educational homogamy in marriage behaviour of immigrants in 
Denmark, which means that the dependent variable is an indicator for marrying a relatively 
well-educated spouse. To test PAM, the main explanatory variable is a similar education 
variable for the interviewed individual itself.   7
As the interviewed immigrants have spent a significant part of their childhood in Denmark, 
their education has mainly been obtained in Denmark. The completed education is 
represented by seven categories: no diploma, primary education, high school, vocational 
school, short higher education, medium higher education and long higher education. The 
variable “no diploma” refers to the individuals who have no education or who have not 
completed primary school, which is compulsory (9 or 10 years in Denmark). After primary 
education, pupils can start either at high school or at a vocational school (apprenticeship), or 
leave the formal educational system. Qualifying educations consist of vocational education or 
a completed ‘higher education’, which may be either ‘short’ (2-4 years, e.g. laboratory 
technician, dental hygienist and other mainly technical educations), ‘medium’ (3-4 years, e.g. 
teachers, nurses, engineers, bachelors) or ‘long’ (5-6 years, university). As a rule of thumb, 
higher educations demand completed high-school qualifications. 
The idea is to test whether individuals from the higher (lower) part of the educational 
distribution systematically tend to marry spouses from the higher (lower) part of their 
educational distribution. We are concerned with the level of education at the time of the 
marriage rather than at the time of the survey, which resembles an assumption of no 
foresight.
7 This is computed by use of age at marriage. Computations are based on the 
assumption that individuals enrol and complete at standard ages. We create a variable 
showing whether the level of education at the time of the marriage was above the median in 
the gender-specific distribution.  
The variable for whether the interviewed individual is well-educated is created by dividing 
the interviewed individuals by gender and country of origin. For each individual, we 
determine their percentile rank in the appropriate educational distribution for their 
demographic group as defined by gender and country of origin. Then we create an indicator 
for whether they have an education above the median in their distribution and this indicator is 
included as an explanatory variable in the regression analysis. For the spouses, a similar 
variable (the dependent variable of the analysis) is created while computing the percentile 
rank in the educational distribution of the relevant demographic group as defined by gender 
and country of origin of their partner. Hence, two dichotomous variables are created as simple 
measures for the two partners’ educational attainment relative to the relevant distribution. In 
the empirical analysis, we investigate the sensitivity of the results to the choice of the median 
as the threshold. 
Table A1 in Appendix A shows that about one third of the immigrants and fewer among their 
spouses have education above the median. Table A2 gives more details about the dependent 
variable and shows that the median persons (both individual and the potentially imported 
spouse) from Pakistan have high-school education, whereas the Turks and the females from 
                                                 
7 Jakobsen and Smith (2003) are concerned about the opposite relationship, since they analyse how marriage affects the 
educational career for this sample.   8
Ex-Yugoslavia only have basic education. It is striking that the male spouses have lower 
education than the female spouses, but that may be a result of PAM in action since the female 
immigrants have lower education than the male immigrants, and therefore they would marry 
lower educated spouses if they follow the pattern of PAM. 
It is implicitly assumed that educations of spouses from different countries of origin are 
comparable, which means that education of Danish spouses is comparable to education of 
spouses imported from Turkey, Pakistan and Ex-Yugoslavia.  
3.3.  Other variables  
Besides the education variables, the main variable of interest is the “type” of spouse. We 
construct a dichotomous variable taking the value 1 if the individual is married to or cohabit 
with a marriage migrant taking the value 0 if married to or cohabit with another type of 
partner. A marriage migrant is a person who immigrates to Denmark for the purpose of 
getting married or engaged to an immigrant in Denmark who is from the same country of 
origin.  
Thus, we utilise two pieces of information in constructing the first explanatory variable; that 
is if the spouse is from the same country of origin as the immigrant, and if the spouse or 
partner has been living in the country of origin before marriage or engagement. However, 
although we have information on whether the spouse is from and has been living in Ex-
Yugoslavia, Turkey or Pakistan, we do not have information on which one of these countries 
the spouse is from. Thus, we assume that people marry or get engaged to persons from their 
own country of origin. It is extremely rare
8 that, for example, a Turkish immigrant imports a 
Pakistani wife instead of a Turkish wife. Being married to ‘other partner’ means that the 
immigrant did not import a spouse from the country of origin for the purpose of getting 
married or engaged. Thus, the individual is married or engaged to a Dane, a Western or non-
Western immigrant who has been living in Denmark or in a country other than that of ethnic 
origin.  
The advantage of using this data set comes from the opportunity of utilising detailed 
information on variables that reflect attitudes, experiences and traditions. These variables 
would not be available in the register data, though they are potentially important determinants 
of marriage behaviour of immigrants. There are more than hundred variables that are thought 
to reflect preferences for marriage migration among the migrants, and some data reduction 
method is needed. We select a number of variables that are not closely related to education of 
the parents. Factor analysis is used to combine similar characteristics into broader categories, 
reducing the dimensions of attitudes of individuals to two factors. In Appendix B, the two 
factors are described and the twenty-five variables that they summarize are listed. The 
                                                 
8 See Matthiessen (2000).   9
included ‘raw’ variables mainly reflect the type and frequency of arguments with parents and 
their attitude and ranking of Danish versus source country culture.  
The first factor is labelled conflicts with parents, and it reflects whether the individual argued 
with the parents about leaving home, choosing a partner, education, work and about leisure 
activities. The degree of conflicts with parents may indicate the willingness of the individual 
to challenge the norms of his/her family and source country. Nauck (1989), Phalet and Claeys 
(1993) and Phalet and Schonpflug (2001) argue that close family ties and support are 
important characteristics of non-Western immigrants, which increases the costs of non-
conformist behaviour through the expected reactions of the social context. The second factor 
is labelled cultural assimilation, and the high loadings are associated with a preference for 
Danish culture for instance when it comes to gender role patterns, divorces, treatment of the 
old and children. These two factors are used as explanatory variables in the probit estimations 
describing the education of the spouse and the decision to import a spouse. Both are expected 
to be negatively related to importing a spouse, and they are meant to serve as instruments for 
the import decision. 
The factors are orthogonal by construction, and the mean is zero, whereas the standard 
deviation is unity, also by construction. Table A1 shows the means of the factors for the 
sample of people who were married at the time of survey by gender and country of origin. 
Substantial differences show up in the means. Women are more culturally assimilated than 
men, whereas men have more conflicts with parents than women. Ex-Yugoslavian immigrants 
are more culturally assimilated and have more arguments with parents than immigrants from 
the other countries of origin.  
We also try to include variables that are related to work effort and attachment to employment, 
such as whether the individual was a full-time worker or not and information on 
unemployment frequency. With regard to unemployment frequency, two variables are used, 
where the first one shows if the individual has been unemployed all the time within the last 3-
5 years, and the second one shows if he/she has never been unemployed within this period. 
Although we have this information at the time of the survey rather than at the time of the 
marriage, we intend to utilise it as general indicators of labour market attachment, in spite of 
the various weaknesses of these variables to indicate labour market attachment fully. We also 
test the effect of changing eligibility rules for imported spouses over the relevant period. 
However, none of these variables seem to have explanatory power, and therefore we are not 
going to touch upon them in the next section. 
 
4.  Empirical analysis 
In the empirical analysis, we study the education of immigrants and their spouses. We test 
two hypotheses: the exchange hypothesis and the hypothesis of positive assortative matching 
(PAM). First, we compare the education of two spouses by use of simple tests. After that, we   10
investigate what determines the probability of marrying a spouse with an education above the 
median by the use of regression analysis. This allows us to test the two main hypotheses of 
the paper. 
4.1.  Simple tests of assortative mating 
In Table 1, we present a cross table of the education of immigrants in Denmark and their 
spouses. The crudest absolute measure of assortative matching is the simple sum of 
percentages at the diagonal of this table. Here we find 45% of the sample on the diagonal, 
which is standard for most countries and for native Danes (Svarer, forthcoming). Hence, it 
seems that the stylized fact of PAM is confirmed for immigrants in Denmark.  
Table 1. Cross tabulation of education of married individuals in the sample. 
Education of spouse
Basic school /no 
diploma
Vocational 
/high school Short higher Medium higher Long higher Total
Basic school/no 
diploma Count 164 50 13 2 2 231
% of Total 30.65 9.35 2.43 0.37 0.37 43.18
Vocational/high 
school Count 109 70 36 19 9 243
% of Total 20.37 13.08 6.73 3.55 1.68 45.42
Short higher Count 15 9 3 2 1 30
% of Total 2.80 1.68 0.56 0.37 0.19 5.61
Medium higher Count 5 6 1 2 1 15
% of Total 0.93 1.12 0.19 0.37 0.19 2.80
Long higher Count 3 4 4 2 3 16
% of Total 0.56 0.75 0.75 0.37 0.56 2.99
Total Count 296 139 57 27 16 535
% of Total 55.33 25.98 10.65 5.05 2.99 100
Education of individual
 
However, Halpin and Chan (2002) remind us that this measure is very sensitive to differences 
in the marginal distributions of education for the two spouses and that a large diagonal sum 
could be due to a high aggregation level of the educational groups. Therefore, we test the 
correlation between the educations of the two spouses. This is done by use of Kendall’s Tau 
which is the appropriate correlation measure between two ranked discrete variables. 
Looking at Kendall’s Tau in 2, we see that for most sub-groups the correlation is significantly 
positive and therefore confirms the above conclusion. However, when the groups are broken 
down by gender of the interviewed individual and by country of origin, varying patterns 
emerge. In particular, for individuals from Pakistan there is no systematic relationship 
between the educations of the two spouses. Breaking down the sample in smaller sub-
samples, we see that female individuals from Pakistan are less prone to marry a spouse with 
the same level of education compared to their male counterparts.    11
Furthermore, Kendall’s Tau is not significantly different from zero for males who did not 
import their spouse. These raw tests indicate that education may play a different role for 
different sub-groups. In the regression analyses in the next sub-section, we investigate the 
covariance of education and other background characteristics in more detail.   





Immigrants who are not married to m.m. 0.25*




Males married to m.m. 0.37*
Females married to m.m. 0.31*
Males married to other type of spouse 0.15








Note: * means that the correlation is significantly different from zero at the 5% level. 
 
4.2.  Advanced tests of the two main hypotheses 
In this section, regression models are used to test positive assortative mating and the exchange 
hypothesis. To test the hypothesis of PAM, we test whether individuals from the higher 
(lower) part of the educational distribution systematically tend to marry spouses from the 
higher (lower) part of their educational distribution.
9 If that is the case, it is interpreted as 
support to the PAM hypothesis. To test the exchange hypothesis, we investigate whether 
individuals who import spouses systematically marry spouses higher up in the educational 
distribution ceteris paribus.  
As a first step, we estimate univariate probit models. The dependent variable is the indicator 
for having married a spouse with an education above the median or not. The similar variable 
of the individual him- or herself is included as an explanatory variable. If the estimated 
coefficient is significantly positive, it is interpreted as evidence of PAM. In contrast to the 
                                                 
9 See details in the previous section addressing the data.   12
simple tests of assortative mating in the previous section, this approach allows us to control 
for other covariates such as the attitudinal variables and parental background. 
The results of estimation of the univariate probit models are shown in Table 3. LR tests 
indicate that the model might be estimated separately by gender,
10 but not for the three 
countries of origin. We choose to comment on the results from both the gender-specific and 
country-specific estimations because they are informative about robustness of the conclusions 
and about who drives the conclusions.  
From model (1) we see that the coefficient on own education above the median is positive and 
significantly different from zero for all samples but Pakistanis. This lends support to PAM 
and confirms the picture from the simple tests presented above. To test the exchange 
hypothesis, we include an indicator variable for having imported the spouse. If the coefficient 
on this dummy variable is significantly different from zero that is seen as evidence in favour 
of the exchange hypothesis. A positive coefficient would indicate that education of the 
imported spouse is exchanged for a favourable characteristic of the immigrant (such as for 
instance living conditions in the host country), whereas a negative coefficient would indicate 
that education of the immigrant is exchanged for a favourable characteristic of the imported 
spouse (for instance unspoiled norms). The exchange hypothesis is not generally confirmed, 
but it tends to hold for men. In model (1), the coefficient on the import dummy is significant 
at a 10% level.  
In model (2), we include an interaction effect between own education and the indicator for 
having imported a spouse in order to allow for systematic differences in educational mating 
patterns between importers and non-importers. Only for women, the PAM result is robust 
towards this change of specification. For the other samples, the interaction effect tends to 
moderate the PAM effect found in model (1). Particularly for men, the PAM result evaporates 
and the result in model (1) seems to be driven by the men who import spouses rather than the 
men who marry women in Denmark. Furthermore, the support to the exchange hypothesis is 
strengthened. In model (3), we include the two factors to account for attitudes. They exert no 
significant influence on the probability of marriage to a spouse with education above the 
mean, and they do not affect the conclusions. Neither the interaction term nor the factors are 
significant, and so far the preferred model is model (1). 
                                                 
10 It is a borderline case. For the univariate probit models, p-values are above 10%, whereas for the bivariate probit models p-
values are just below 10%.   13 
Table 3. Estimation of a probit model for marriage to a spouse with education above the median. 
Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev
Model (1):
Own educ>median 0.553 0.140 0.682 0.208 0.510 0.198 0.798 0.227 0.109 0.261 0.719 0.260
Imported spouse -0.051 0.169 0.355 0.252 -0.437 0.238 -0.393 0.308 -0.108 0.330 0.222 0.268
Turkey 0.728 0.168 0.675 0.223 0.889 0.269
Pakistan -0.024 0.181 -0.002 0.242 -0.044 0.284
Male -0.668 0.130 -0.663 0.192 -0.742 0.257 -0.552 0.264
Constant -0.884 0.183 -1.240 0.274 -1.322 0.241 0.093 0.308 -0.645 0.356 -1.169 0.292
Log likelihood
Model (2):
Own educ>median 0.386 0.282 0.693 0.458 0.080 0.378 1.326 0.687 -0.131 0.580 0.422 0.410
Imported spouse -0.152 0.223 0.545 0.376 -0.687 0.299 -0.234 0.366 -0.256 0.453 -0.026 0.373
Own educ*Imported spouse 0.220 0.324 -0.358 0.504 0.592 0.441 -0.597 0.727 0.302 0.653 0.486 0.525
Turkey 0.731 0.168 0.678 0.223 0.902 0.271
Pakistan -0.024 0.181 0.001 0.243 -0.042 0.287
Male -0.679 0.131 -0.651 0.192 -0.759 0.261 -0.575 0.267
Constant -0.795 0.222 -1.416 0.380 -1.147 0.267 -0.056 0.359 -0.512 0.449 -0.990 0.339
Log likelihood
Model (3):
Own educ>median 0.390 0.283 0.985 0.461 0.119 0.381 1.366 0.687 -0.037 0.606 0.421 0.411
Imported spouse -0.124 0.232 0.466 0.390 -0.592 0.307 -0.213 0.374 -0.114 0.519 0.026 0.388
Own educ*Imported spouse 0.210 0.325 -0.358 0.507 0.539 0.445 -0.635 0.729 0.167 0.684 0.465 0.528
Conflicts with parents 0.029 0.070 -0.100 0.117 0.118 0.089 -0.020 0.103 0.192 0.164 0.032 0.131
Culturally assimilated 0.014 0.065 -0.019 0.099 0.041 0.089 0.085 0.089 -0.246 0.145 0.068 0.140
Turkey 0.731 0.168 0.676 0.224 0.893 0.271
Pakistan -0.022 0.182 -0.012 0.243 -0.059 0.290
Male -0.680 0.134 -0.628 0.194 -0.993 0.299 -0.560 0.269













-142 -254 -123 -108 -62 -65
-65 -62 -254 -142 -109 -124
Pakistan Ex-Yugoslavia All Women Men Turkey
 
Note: Boldface indicates significance at a 5% level, whereas italics indicate significance at a 10% level.   14 
 
Table 4. Summary of coefficients of main interest.  
Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev.
Univariate probit
Model without import dummy
Own educ > median  0.553 0.140 0.682 0.208 0.510 0.198 0.798 0.227 0.109 0.261 0.719 0.260
Model without interaction
Own educ > median  0.550 0.140 0.699 0.210 0.510 0.199 0.807 0.228 0.096 0.266 0.705 0.261
Imported spouse  -0.025 0.176 0.273 0.269 -0.360 0.245 -0.388 0.314 -0.025 0.376 0.268 0.281
Model with interaction
Own educ>median 0.386 0.282 0.693 0.458 0.080 0.378 1.326 0.687 -0.131 0.580 0.422 0.410
Imported spouse -0.152 0.223 0.545 0.376 -0.687 0.299 -0.234 0.366 -0.256 0.453 -0.026 0.373
Own educ*Imported spouse 0.220 0.324 -0.358 0.504 0.592 0.441 -0.597 0.727 0.302 0.653 0.486 0.525
Bivariate probit
Model without interaction
Own educ > median  0.519 0.153 0.725 0.218 0.421 0.214 0.790 0.236 0.021 0.245 0.580 0.338
Imported spouse  -0.349 0.544 0.642 0.554 -1.357 0.817 -0.554 1.157 -1.451 0.850 -0.360 0.841
Model with interaction
Own educ > median  0.328 0.295 1.054 0.466 -0.050 0.298 1.319 0.690 -0.135 0.461 0.248 0.474
Imported spouse  -0.520 0.601 0.907 0.628 -2.093 0.681 -0.396 1.118 -1.541 0.872 -0.744 0.994
Own educ*Imported spouse 0.243 0.321 -0.401 0.501 0.626 0.354 -0.598 0.727 0.213 0.536 0.482 0.492
Note: Information on parents is not included. Gender and country of origin included where appropriate.
Pakistan Ex-Yugoslavia All Women Men Turkey
 
Note: Boldface indicates significance at a 5% level, whereas italics indicate significance at a 10% level. 
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There might be unobserved factors such as norms, traditions, attitudes or preferences that 
affect both the decision to import a partner and the education of the future partner. If that is 
the case, the indicator for importing a partner would be endogenous in the estimated probit 
model. We test that by estimating a bivariate probit model. The results are summarized in 
Table 4, and the full set of results is presented in Appendix C.  
As instruments for the indicator for importing a spouse, we use the two factors: conflicts with 
parents and cultural assimilation. The strength and validity of the instruments are confirmed 
for most samples, and both have highly significant negative effects on the probability of 
importing a spouse as expected. We find that the more the immigrant argues with his or her 
parents and the more he or she prefers Danish culture, the less likely it is that he or she 
imports a partner. The finding that the two factors are important determinants of importing a 
spouse may be interpreted as evidence that the functional form of the utility functions (f(.) and 
g(.)) actually differs across those importing  a spouse and those not importing a spouse. The 
negative effects of the factors support our argument that the decision to import a spouse and 
the subsequent decision about whom to import are household decisions rather than solely 
individual decisions. In case of no import, the decision is more likely an individual decision. 
This explains the different functional forms of f(.) and g(.) between the two groups. In 
addition to the factors, gender and country of origin affect the probability of marrying a 
person from the home country. Turkish and Pakistani immigrants have higher probabilities of 
importing a partner than the Ex-Yugoslavians have (reference category), hence for Turks and 
Pakistanis there is an excess probability of importing a spouse, which is not explained by 
differences in the included variables. 
For all samples, the correlation coefficient in the bivariate probit model is not rejected to be 
zero, which indicates that two univariate probit equations would be preferred over the 
bivariate probit model. Therefore, we only use the results of the bivariate probit model as a 
robustness check.  
Coefficient estimates for the total sample are largely unchanged as well as the consistent 
support to PAM for women. It is worth noting, that the coefficient to the import dummy is 
nowhere negative for women, it is always positive but insignificant. For men, the negative 
effect of importing a spouse on the education of the spouse is very strong, and the PAM 
conclusion is now accepted at a 10% significance level for men having an imported spouse. 
Hence, male immigrants who import a spouse tend to have lower educated spouses, but the 
probability of getting a spouse with education above the median increases with own 
education. For male immigrants who do not import a spouse, we see no systematic 
relationship between the educations of the spouses. This is exactly the same as Kendall’s Tau 
in Table 2.   16
Looking at the country-specific results, the only change is seen for Pakistanis, who also have 
the largest and most well-determined correlation coefficient. The coefficient to the import 
dummy becomes negative and significant at a 10% level. This is a vague indication that 
education of the immigrant is exchanged for favourable characteristics of the imported 
spouse, such as unspoiled norms.  
In the bivariate probit model, the estimated effects for conflicts with parents and cultural 
assimilation are generally estimated to have a negative effect on the likelihood of importing a 
spouse. The finding of a negative effect of spouse import for men and Pakistanis may 
therefore be interpreted as indirect evidence that a high level of cultural assimilation and 
conflicts with parents works as an exchange mechanism resulting in a better educated spouse 
through less spouse import. In the case of an instrumental variables estimation procedure, this 
is labelled the local average treatment effect (LATE) in the experimental literature (Angrist 
and Kruger, 1999). 
To sum up, the main conclusion of this section is that only for women we find evidence of 
PAM regardless of the specification of the model. For men, there tends to be PAM, but the 
conclusion is not robust towards changes of the specification, and the result seems to hold 
mainly for spouse importers. We always reject PAM for Pakistanis, whereas we almost 
consistently confirm PAM for Turks.  
In general, the results are in accordance with the study for the US by Kalmijn (1993), who 
reports a high focus on education as a sorting mechanism, among immigrants. However, we 
find important exceptions to this trend, for Pakistanis and male spouse importers. The analysis 
does not directly reveal why this is the case. It may be that these individuals match on status 
(as reflected in e.g. kinship or on other networks) rather than on education. This would be 
consistent with marriage patterns of more traditional societies. As seen in Blau and Duncan 
(1967) and discussed by Smits et al. (1998), earlier studies focus on status homogamy, which 
means a close relationship between the social backgrounds of the two spouses. 
 
4.3.  Sensitivity analysis 
So far, we have studied PAM by testing whether there is a systematic tendency that an 
immigrant with an education above (below) the median marries a spouse with an education 
above (below) the median. The choice of median as the threshold is arbitrary. In Table 5, we 
investigate how the conclusions about PAM and exchange are affected by changing the 
thresholds. We change the thresholds for the individual and the spouse simultaneously to 25, 
40 and 75%, respectively. For women, we see that a threshold of 75% means that PAM only 
holds for women who do not import spouses. Thus, if a woman is above the 75
th percentile of 
her educational distribution, she would not necessarily obtain a spouse who matches her 
position in the distribution if she imports a partner. However, if she marries a non-imported   17
man, she is likely to match positively on education. For the sample of males, we see that the 
coefficient to the import dummy tends to be negative. The lower the threshold, the more 
likely it is that the coefficient is negative, and similarly for the total sample. This means that 
the probability of getting a spouse with an education above the lowest quartile is lower if the 
spouse is imported. This result reflects the fact that males import females with no education at 
all. For Turkey it is seen, that the higher the threshold is, the more stable is the PAM result, 
whereas the opposite is the case for Ex-Yugoslavia. 
Table 5. Sensitivity analysis/robustness check.  
25% 40% 50% 75% 25%, 40% 50% 75% 25% 40% 50% 75%
Model (1):
Own educ>median 0.256 0.379 0.553 0.450 0.311 0.682 0.391 0.240 0.517 0.510 0.566
Imported spouse -0.327 -0.277 -0.051 -0.126 0.236 0.355 0.087 -0.595 -0.697 -0.437 -0.379
Log likelihood -346 -302 -254 -168 -146 -142 -109 -176 -134 -109 -58
Model (2):
Own educ>median 0.310 0.277 0.386 0.553 0.788 0.969 1.116 -0.040 0.552 0.080 0.076
Imported spouse -0.282 -0.340 -0.152 -0.069 0.612 0.545 0.460 -0.849 -0.680 -0.687 -0.740
Own educ*Imported spouse -0.068 0.133 0.220 -0.152 -0.555 -0.358 -1.024 0.354 -0.049 0.592 0.828
Log likelihood -346 -302 -254 -168 -146 -142 -107 -175 -134 -108 -57
25% 40% 50% 75% 25% 40% 50% 75% 25% 40% 50% 75%
Model (1):
Own educ>median -0.057 0.359 0.798 0.857 0.341 0.128 0.109 0.126 0.592 0.639 0.719 0.555
Imported spouse -0.459 -0.429 -0.393 -0.868 -0.068 -0.114 -0.108 -0.109 -0.270 -0.260 0.222 0.181
Log likelihood -130 -128 -124 -34 -102 -65 -65 -65 -91 -91 -62 -64
Model (2):
Own educ>median -0.278 0.344 1.326 1.657 -0.486 -0.280 -0.131 0.151 0.872 0.683 0.422 0.354
Imported spouse -0.638 -0.438 -0.234 -0.422 -0.754 -0.386 -0.256 -0.096 0.010 -0.231 -0.026 0.068
Own educ*Imported spouse 0.240 0.017 -0.597 -1.057 0.996 0.498 0.302 -0.033 -0.442 -0.076 0.486 0.386






5.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we shed light on marriage patterns of immigrants. We test two main hypotheses, 
namely the hypothesis of positive assortative matching (PAM) and the exchange hypothesis. 
In the empirical analyses, we use survey data on children of the guest worker immigrants in 
Denmark, who are originally from Ex-Yugoslavia, Turkey and Pakistan. 
We argue that the probability of a match between an immigrant and a marriage migrant is 
determined by their expected utilities from the match. The utility function depends on the 
household’s preferences over the observable characteristics of the individual. Both the source 
country and the immigrant household’s preferences depend upon the origin of the spouse. 
From the point of view of the source country household, the possibility of obtaining a 
residence permit in a host country with favourable wage or welfare schemes may enhance the 
preferences for a spouse from the host country. From the point of view of the host country 
household, utility may increase if the spouse is related to the household in question and has 
unspoiled norms and traditions. Furthermore, they might value the fact that they are able to 
please relatives in the country of origin. As a result, an exchange may take place, such that   18
strong preferences for a specific origin of the spouse compensates for a lower level of an 
observable characteristic, such as education. 
In the empirical analysis, we analyse the determinants of the education of the spouse. We test 
PAM by testing whether an individual with education above (below) a certain threshold in his 
or her educational distribution is more likely to marry an individual with an education above 
(below) the same threshold in the relevant educational distribution. We find evidence 
supportive of PAM for women regardless of the specification of the model. For men, there 
tends to be PAM, but the conclusion is not robust towards changes of the specification, and 
the result seems to hold mainly for spouse importers. We always reject PAM for Pakistanis, 
whereas we almost consistently confirm PAM for Turks. For men, we see that importing a 
partner reduces the probability of obtaining a well-educated spouse, which is interpreted as 
support to the exchange hypothesis, which would be consistent with a situation where 
traditional, unspoiled norms of the imported woman is traded against education.  
We use both univariate and bivariate probit models, and hence we allow the import decision 
to be an endogenous variable in the education equation. Using the bivariate probit model 
shows that the effect of importing a spouse becomes even more negative and significant for 
men, and it becomes significant for Pakistanis. This indicates that through less spouse import, 
the probability of a favourable match in the marriage market is highest for those who increase 
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Appendix A: Descriptives 
Table A1. Means. 
All Women Men Turkey Pakistan Ex-Yugoslavia
Spouse's educ>median 0.228 0.325 0.148 0.343 0.142 0.168
Own educ>median 0.305 0.267 0.337 0.214 0.379 0.348
Imported spouse 0.787 0.819 0.759 0.905 0.817 0.594
Conflicts with parents -0.067 -0.198 0.042 -0.167 -0.047 0.047
Culturally assimilated -0.067 0.129 -0.165 -0.016 -0.141 0.068
Turkey 0.393 0.412 0.378 1.000 0.000 0.000
Pakistan 0.316 0.276 0.351 0.000 1.000 0.000
Male 0.545 0.000 1.000 0.524 0.604 0.510
Comes from village 0.547 0.543 0.550 0.690 0.391 0.523
Fathers educ>9 years 0.199 0.193 0.203 0.071 0.166 0.406
Mothers educ> 9 years 0.206 0.235 0.182 0.029 0.278 0.368
N 534 243 291 210 169 155  
 
 
Table A2. Accumulated distribution of education. 
Turkey Pakistan Ex-Yugoslavia Turkey Pakistan Ex-Yugoslavia
No diploma 0.41 0.04 0.21 0.30 0.05 0.05
Basic school 0.86 0.42 0.58 0.72 0.33 0.32
Vocational education 0.96 0.72 0.79 0.82 0.56 0.72
High school 0.96 0.81 0.84 0.86 0.62 0.78
Short higher 0.99 0.94 0.93 0.94 0.80 0.92
Medium higher 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.90 0.99
Long higher 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
N 100 67 76 110 102 79
Turkey Pakistan Ex-Yugoslavia Turkey Pakistan Ex-Yugoslavia
Basic school/no diploma 0.56 0.10 0.22 0.75 0.35 0.41
Vocationa/high school 0.91 0.76 0.75 0.98 0.92 0.91
Short higher 0.94 0.87 0.87 0.99 0.99 0.95
Medium higher 0.96 0.91 0.95 1.00 1.00 0.97
Long higher 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
N 100 67 76 110 102 79
Female immigrants Male immigrants
Female spouses Male spouses 
 
Note: Country refers to country of origin of the immigrant.   22
Appendix B: Factor analysis 
 
We restrict the number of factors to two and suppress factor loadings with an absolute value 
below 0.20. We use the Varimax method.  
 
 
Table B1. Rotated Component Matrix. 
 
Arguments with parents
argued parents, leaving home 0,83 equality of gender, Danish culture best 0,62
didn't argue parents, leaving home -0,81 individual freedom, Danish culture best 0,61
argued parents, left home 0,81 bringing up children, Danish culture best 0,59
didn't argue parents, left home -0,71 divorces, Danish culture best 0,59
argued parents, spare time 0,55 equality of gender, co culture best -0,53
didn't argue parents, spare time -0,55 individual freedom, co culture best -0,53
argued parents, choice of partner 0,51 divorces, co culture best -0,49
argued parents, choice of edu., work 0,41 treatment of old, Danish culture best 0,46
didn't argue parents, choice of edu., work -0,41 bringing up children, co culture best -0,45
didn't argue parents, choice of partner -0,34 treatment of old, co culture best -0,39
feel as a Dane 0,27
feel at home in DK 0,26
feel as a Ex-Yg., Turk, Pakistani -0,21
feel at home in co
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Appendix C: Results from estimation of bivariate probit models. 
Table C1. Results from estimation of a bivariate probit model without interaction effects. 
Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev.
Education equation
Own educ > median  0.519 0.153 0.725 0.218 0.421 0.214 0.790 0.236 0.021 0.245 0.580 0.338
Imported spouse  -0.349 0.544 0.642 0.554 -1.357 0.817 -0.554 1.157 -1.451 0.850 -0.360 0.841
Turkey 0.811 0.212 0.608 0.255 1.153 0.302
Pakistan 0.045 0.214 -0.071 0.271 0.158 0.307
Male -0.680 0.130 -0.661 0.193 -0.792 0.243 -0.600 0.259
Constant -0.681 0.408 -1.437 0.425 -0.692 0.684 0.239 1.062 0.650 0.850 -0.710 0.738
Import equation
Own educ > median  -0.359 0.140 -0.472 0.230 -0.259 0.186 -0.224 0.287 -0.336 0.239 -0.456 0.224
Conflicts with parents -0.343 0.064 -0.575 0.118 -0.247 0.077 -0.324 0.119 -0.450 0.114 -0.281 0.105
Culturally assimilated -0.217 0.071 -0.272 0.129 -0.167 0.085 -0.160 0.136 -0.083 0.139 -0.279 0.111
Turkey 1.019 0.165 0.717 0.254 1.178 0.229
Pakistan 0.701 0.162 0.699 0.283 0.674 0.205
Male -0.255 0.141 0.095 0.273 -0.383 0.283 -0.410 0.218
Constant 0.549 0.141 0.705 0.196 0.206 0.152 1.335 0.200 1.370 0.250 0.669 0.189
° 0.184 0.316 -0.194 0.339 0.546 0.452 0.087 0.604 0.805 0.390 0.376 0.501
Tests




Both factors, F-stat., °
2(2)








Notes: 1. Bold letters indicate significance at a 5% level, whereas italics indicate significance at a 10% level. 2. Test of exclusion restrictions in the education equation. 3. F-test for joint significance of the instruments in the import equation. 
4. LR test for including education of parents and coming from a village.
0.45 0.33 0.31 0.84 0.02
-157
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Table C2. Results from estimation of a bivariate probit model with interaction effects. 
Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev. Coefficient Std. Dev.
Education equation
Own educ > median  0.328 0.295 1.054 0.466 -0.050 0.298 1.319 0.690 -0.135 0.461 0.248 0.474
Imported spouse  -0.520 0.601 0.907 0.628 -2.093 0.681 -0.396 1.118 -1.541 0.872 -0.744 0.994
Own educ*Imported spouse 0.243 0.321 -0.401 0.501 0.626 0.354 -0.598 0.727 0.213 0.536 0.482 0.492
Turkey 0.829 0.213 0.598 0.255 1.260 0.265
Pakistan 0.057 0.215 -0.081 0.270 0.254 0.281
Male -0.694 0.131 -0.648 0.193 -0.807 0.247 -0.627 0.257
Constant -0.541 0.458 -1.669 0.507 -0.129 0.578 0.091 1.029 0.726 0.860 -0.414 0.869
Import equation
Own educ > median  -0.362 0.140 -0.478 0.230 -0.290 0.182 -0.219 0.288 -0.357 0.244 -0.462 0.224
Conflicts with parents -0.343 0.064 -0.575 0.118 -0.238 0.074 -0.325 0.118 -0.446 0.116 -0.277 0.105
Culturally assimilated -0.217 0.071 -0.269 0.129 -0.161 0.082 -0.161 0.137 -0.086 0.139 -0.276 0.111
Turkey 1.018 0.165 0.717 0.254 1.147 0.224
Pakistan 0.702 0.162 0.697 0.283 0.667 0.205
Male -0.258 0.142 0.095 0.272 -0.384 0.284 -0.414 0.219
Constant 0.552 0.142 0.708 0.196 0.226 0.153 1.334 0.197 1.380 0.254 0.675 0.191
π 0.220 0.329 -0.229 0.331 0.797 0.305 0.087 0.568 0.796 0.405 0.462 0.562
Tests




Both factors, F-test, π
2(2)






Notes: 1. Bold letters indicate significance at a 5% level, whereas italics indicate significance at a 10% level. 2. Test of exclusion restrictions in the education equation. 3. F-test for joint significance 
of the instruments in the import equation. 
All Women Men Turkey
6.96 0.55





-0.17 -0.53 1.34 -0.46
10.42 0.94
-0.05 0.08 -0.09 0.95
36.36 28.23 12.00 8.28
-2.20 -0.02
15.12 11.38
-481 -227 -244 -184 -132 -157
169 155 534 243 291 210
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